Nettet28. okt. 2008 · Searle: “Proper Names and Intentionality” Searle’s Account Of The Problem In this essay, Searle emphasizes the notion of ‘Intentional content’, rather than the ‘cluster of descriptions’ that Kripke uses to characterize Searle’s position. Searle’s central position is that “linguistic reference is always dependent on or is a Nettetthose organisms themselves have conscious intentional states and processes). (pp. 51-52) As usual, Searle conflates the issue of whether some intentionality must be original (yes) with the issue of whether original intentionality must be primi-tive (no). But in any case, what does the work is the intentionality, not the consciousness.
Intentionality, Consciousness, and Subjectivity - JSTOR
NettetSearle here investigates the semantics of proper names, indexicals, and natural kind terms, and discusses the de rejde dicto distinction. Although the Intentionality of … Nettet22. jun. 2002 · One way philosophers have often explained what they mean by “intentionality” is this: it is that aspect of mental states or events that consists in their … how many satellites are there in navic
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Intentionalism is the thesis that all mental states are intentional, i.e. that they are about something: about their intentional object. This thesis has also been referred to as "representationalism". Intentionalism is entailed by Brentano's claim that intentionality is "the mark of the mental": if all and only mental states are intentional then it is surely the case that all mental states are intentional. Nettetstates or intentionality per se (Searle 1983: 160). In this regard, human linguistic activities can be explicated through intentionality. The content of speech act or linguis-tic expressions is derived from the intentional content of mental states or thoughts. Nevertheless, the naturalistic grounding of the mental is derived from the thesis that Nettet‘The account which follows is a very brief summary of the theory of Intentionality advanced in Searle (1971 & 1979). In order to distinguish the technical sense of “lntentionality” from the ordinary English intend, intention, etc.. I … how did archer lose his eye